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TEACHING NOTES
Dynamic Tension: Security, Stability, and the Opium Trade
By Peter Curry∗
This case it is about managing a set of complex or wicked problems in an uncertain
environment, not about the opium trade in Afghanistan per se.. Students will learn about
the tools for influencing events or potential outcomes when one does not have direct
control over the stakeholders. The overall question is, “How do you get your mission
accomplished when you are just one actor on the stage with several actors—each of
whom is reading from a different script?”
Military officers at the War College level (executive or near-executive level) are
undergoing a professional maturation process. They are leaving the tactical world, where
issues tend to be fairly defined and bounded, the outcomes are relatively known, and
decisions are made to fix the most urgent problem. That kind of thinking was absolutely
essential when they were commanding units at the “pointy end” of the spear. Now, they
are a bit more removed from the front lines. If these students rely too much on their
intuition and experiences at their new level, they tend to bind and define the problem too
narrowly and to default to a solution with which they are comfortable rather than making
the best choice for the mission.

OBJECTIVE
This case study is designed to push them out of their comfort zones. As they mature as
leaders, they will operate in a different world. They must move from a primarily tactical
mindset to a more operational or strategic world view as they begin to lead ever-larger
organizations. In these organizations, issues tend to be undefined. The answer is not
linear; the answer will probably be part of a larger iterative process, requiring constant
assessment and reappraisal. Victory, or end state, is not clear. This issue cannot be solved
or fixed; rather, the issue might have to be managed over a long period of time to achieve
an acceptable set of conditions.
Flexibility was the touchstone when constructing this case study. This study can have
several applications: a decision-making exercise, a consensus-building study, or an
adjunct to a policy lesson. Additionally, it could serve as a compare–contrast case with a
similar one for U.S.-Colombia efforts showing the similarities and differences.
∗

Peter E. Curry is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and Army Chair at
the Marine Corps War College MCWAR, Quantico, VA and serves as the Course
Director for the National Security and Joint Warfighting focusing on Joint, Multinational,
and Interagency issues involving the U.S. military.
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The case study assumes that the instructor will have some familiarity with the issues
in Afghanistan or the issues presented prior to the case study. For instance, if your prior
class is about the principles of collaborative, interagency processes, then your focus
would be there. Some modification of the lesson would be necessary. Currently there is
no bibliography; however, many of the footnotes in the case study are also an excellent
representation of the latest work on the subject. In addition, the Marine Corps War
College Lesson Plan (Enclosure One) discusses many of the policy issues about security
in Afghanistan.
LESSON ONE
1. Introduce the Problem
This lesson is designed to be taught in two successive sessions. The first will have a guest
speaker, instructor lecture, or discussion of the policy options for reducing drugs or
instability in Afghanistan, followed by the introduction of the case study. The next lesson
will focus on policy execution. Most of the time, guest speakers and instructor lectures
focus on the policy issues only. The overall lesson is designed to highlight the
complexities of policy execution. It serves as a way to reinforce the idea that policy is
“easier said than done.” The lesson conveys the idea that issuing policy in a national
capital is very different from executing that policy on the ground.
Enclosure One is a key part of the lesson plan that we teach at the Marine Corps War
College for the guest speaker lesson. It is attached at the end of these teaching notes. The
instructor will have to modify the lesson plan in accordance with the learning objectives.
While the instructor might not have access to guest speakers, etc., this lesson is designed
to be complementary to a larger course or subsection of a course. Again, flexibility is the
key component--emphasize what you want.
2. Introduce the Case Study
After the lecture or discussion is complete, introduce the case study toward the latter part
of the first lesson as a way of reinforcing the lecture. The case study is to gain an
understanding of Colonel Thompson’s dilemma of trying to establish security and
stability without causing significant damage to or weakening the social, economic, and
political systems that are in place. No solutions should be elicited other than perhaps
generalized, long-range plans. If the students jump right into solving the problem, then it
offers up an opportunity to discuss how framing a problem set too early can anchor the
group in an overly narrow solution set. The first step is to understand the problem. The
case study ends purposely with an open-ended issue; the students provide their own
conclusions later.
The study revolves around a fictitious brigade combat team (BCT) commander named
Colonel Dan Thompson. He is an amalgam of the author’s personal experiences, the
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experiences of other officers gained in informal interviews, and of the military’s lessons
learned from Afghanistan. Please note: It is not designed to be 100 percent accurate, and
a certain ambiguity and incompleteness has been built in to see where the students will go
with the study. Also note that the case study purposely is written from one soldier’s point
of view, with some biases built in. At no time is it designed to represent Department of
Defense (DoD) policy, but some of these biases have appeared when researching this
case study. Some of the criticisms of other organizations (in this case the NGOs) are not
official policy but have been expressed by troops privately, and some of those criticisms
have leaked into the media. The intent is to highlight that those criticisms are present; it is
up to the instructor how best to handle that issue. The bottom line is that many in the
military, privately at least, feel that the military is shouldering most of the load for the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. As one soldier told the author, “The military was told to go
to war, but America was told to go to Wal-Mart.” Including these biases is intended to
elicit a student reaction. In spite of our best efforts, many high-level practitioners state
that personality traits and biases inform our decision-making more than we care to admit.
Part of making collaborative decisions at the strategic level is to understand biases -group and individual, and recognizing the role of norms and cultures. To sanitize the
military biases would detract from the study. In fact, we want students during roleplaying to bring some of those organizational positions, biases, and norms into the
discussion. The instructor, however, needs to ensure that the case study doesn’t degrade
into a series of caricatures during student role-play. Emphasize realism. Ask the question,
“Would that official make that kind of a statement and why?”
Background Information
Opening Quotation
Captain Leo Docherty was a British Army officer in the Scots Guard who resigned
after his tour in Afghanistan. He has since been an outspoken critic of both the Iraq and
Afghanistan wars, contributing many op-ed pieces around the world. He wrote a book in
2007 about his experiences, called Desert of Death: A Soldier’s Journey from Iraq to
Afghanistan. He is not without his detractors, who portray him as self-serving and lacking
a deep understanding of the issue. Nonetheless, his quotation serves as an opening into
the case study.
The BCT Organizational Unit in the U.S. Army
A BCT is a flexible organization within the U.S. Army that consists of five thousand
to six thousand soldiers in a combat zone. In Afghanistan, a BCT can be responsible for
several provinces encompassing thousands of square miles. By contrast, in a conventional
war scenario, a BCT might be responsible for a few square miles, depending on the
situation. Units go where the enemy is; in an unconventional environment, enemy units
are small and dispersed. Consequently, counterinsurgent units must also disperse into
smaller-than-usual units over greater-than-usual distances. A BCT has also grown to be a
mini-interagency element on the ground. Many BCTs have some interface, either directly
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or indirectly, with a number of law enforcement and intelligence agencies. A BCT also
works with the Department of State within its area of operations.
Military Rank and Experience
A captain in the U.K. armed forces is usually in his late 20s or early 30s with between
five and twelve years of military experience. Captain Docherty had seven when he
resigned. A U.S. Army colonel who is a commander is generally between forty-two and
forty-five years old with at least twenty-two years’ experience as an officer. He or she is
a product of extensive military schooling throughout his/her career. A colonel in the U.S.
Army has survived a very rigorous promotion process. Only 5 percent of the entry-level
officers (lieutenants) ever make “full colonel.” Of that group, about 5 to 10 percent of all
colonels become brigade commanders, depending on circumstances and the needs of the
army.
The ISAF (International Security Assistance Force)
The ISAF are the military forces assigned to help establish security in Afghanistan.
The ISAF’s charter supports the UN mandate. In 2003, the United Nations authorized
NATO to assume operational control of the ISAF effort. At the time, the United States
kept most of its forces under a separate command in order to operate more freely within
the country. In 2005 to 2006, both of these headquarters merged into a new single
headquarters under the ISAF charter. Since then, the United States has taken a major role
in providing troops, resources, and direction to the ISAF effort. (See Enclosure Two in
the teaching notes for more information.) The ISAF runs its own Web site, which is a
great source of most current open source information. Also, the ISAF link to its
“placemat” shows the current force “laydown.” The link is
http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf.
The case study’s story line begins with a short synopsis of Colonel Thompson’s personal
experience. This is a critical step in understanding that self-awareness is important to
executive decision-making. Personal and organizational biases quickly tend to anchor a
problem. (The old adage, “If you’re a hammer, then all your problems looks like nails,”
comes to mind.) Students can provide some personal accounts or viewpoints at this time.
Encourage them to do so—it adds richness and immediacy to the problem set at hand.
The other key area is to get students who have little or no experience in the military to
discuss their views of the military. It is always interesting to see both sides of the
discussion work through factual accounts and stereotypes. Typically, this is an “eyeopener” for both groups.
The instructor will notice 4BCT’s specified tasks. A specified task in military parlance
means what the boss specifically tells you to do. Thompson’s military commander may
not have issued this order in the exact manner described, but allowances were made for
the potentially broad range of experience -levels in the class, especially among the
civilian and international students who may or will attend the War College. The case
study was also intended to add a little ambiguity for the military students so they can
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discuss the importance of key words in such documents. Colonel Thompson’s focus is
security; however, one notices that he doesn’t have a specified task for stopping opium
production. Although his unit does not have direct responsibilities, any changes to the
current system by his BCT or by other stakeholders in the area, or any changes to the
current system in opium production, will cause reactions and instability in other areas.
Going after drug lords, for instance, will have an effect on the local economy. If opium
drives the local economy, then farmers lose money to pay off debts. This will certainly
cause instability in the short term.
The first lesson ends with an introduction of some of the stakeholder’s interests.
Assign roles for the next lesson. Hand out Enclosure Two to the students as a primer of
stakeholder interests and viewpoints. The viewpoints match well with the stakeholders’
stated or real policies, but they are purposely broad. The students would be expected to
conduct additional, outside-the-classroom research on the policies and positions of their
assigned group and be ready to role-play. At this point, for War College students, we
would tell them that the quality of their role-playing and their knowledge of the role will
be graded.
QUESTIONS
1. What should Colonel Thompson do?
•

Go back to his commander and have opium tasks specified

•

Travel around to understand the local people

•

Study what?

•

Ignore the opium—it is someone else’s problem

•

Opium is a symptom of bad governance—fix that and the opium problem will go
away. (Ask students, “Is this solution in Thompson’s ‘kit bag’ of
responsibilities?”)

•

Others?

2. What do you make of Thompson’s “Seven Rules?” Do they stand up to scrutiny?
Do they point to a way forward for him in accomplishing the task assigned him?
The issues are varied; take time to explore as many as time allows.
Ask, “What’s the issue?” That should introduce the concept of problem or issue
framing. How you frame an issue generally drives solutions.
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3. Student preparation for the following class/Issue the handout with instructions.
Once the class has formulated some mental model of the kinds of issues that Colonel
Thompson must manage, the class is given the stakeholder background handout. This
handout gives only rudimentary guidance. It is up to the instructor or the students to add
depth to the stakeholders through additional research outside the class. The students will
be divided into a number of stakeholders (the instructor decides how many groups the
students will role-play). The instructor gives the students a basic set of interests that are
not in the handout or allow the students to decide what those interests might be based on.
Source notes in the case study represent a good background for both student and teacher
preparation. There are pros and cons to each approach based on the class’s experience
level or creativity. The instructor could also allow the students to build an “avatar,” or
virtual identity to go along with their role-playing and the instructor should provide a “tilt
chart” for the group. That “tilt chart” could simply be green “up” arrows or red “down”
arrows on the whiteboard, representing each group’s “tilt” toward Colonel Thompson’s
or the U.S.’s agenda. This helps provide some structure to the outcome. The instructor
can allow “free play” if one is comfortable with a different scenario each time the lesson
is presented. Names should be provided or created using traditional
Afghan/U.S./European names. (Do not allow students to come up with Russian or Arabic
names, for example, if they are role-playing a local warlord.)
LESSON TWO
The instructor will role-play Colonel Thompson. The instructor will simulate visits to
each stakeholder. Remember to tell the students that they are doing this step in X
minutes, but under actual, real conditions, Colonel Thompson’s dialogue with each
stakeholder could take several weeks or months through a series of conversations and
meetings to arrive at the level of knowledge that we’ll get in a few minutes in the
classroom. Colonel Thompson must ask leading questions that will elicit an
understanding of each stakeholder’s interests and positions. If students have role-played
well, the rest of the class will also gain an appreciation not only of the dialogue but also
of the tone of the spoken words and the body language of the people involved. These
cues help reinforce the idea that many messages are received on a lot of levels and
filtered differently through different cultures.
In lesson two, the facilitator “drives” or “flies” over to each stakeholder and begins a
conversation. Somewhere in the conversation, Colonel Thompson should elicit an answer
to the question, “If you were me, what do you think I should do?”
Then discuss the potential pitfalls if Colonel Thompson
•

overpromises,

•

under-promises,
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The best answers from the role-players will be a workable solution, but also informed
by their own agenda, not Colonel Thompson’s. This does two things. First, we teach the
students not to offer only problems, but to formulate solutions or recommendations. A
key skill for executives is quickly to sum up complex issues and provide answers. The
second goal is to get the students to understand not only what their organizational goals
are but also what the other stakeholders’ interests are. Encourage the students to put a
“human face” on their organization, rather than just to recite organizational policy. At the
risk of stating the obvious, perceptions about an organization on the ground have a lot to
do with how a person represents his/her organization.
This class is not intended to be a negotiation exercise but could be modified to be one.
This lesson is designed to discuss the complexities of the opium trade while Colonel
Thompson tries to build a strategy where he can gain some consensus and reduce the
resistance to his security plans as he begins his operations.
Some resistance should be expected. Colonel Thompson has a lot of power, and he’ll
have to wield it to accomplish his task. His plan, by design, should have winners and
losers and, in that sense, this is not a classic, business school negotiation exercise, where
the aim is to seek common ground to get a “win-win” solution. Colonel Thompson, the
Afghan government, and the local population are aiming to “win” and extend their
authority over the provinces. If Thompson has to use force, there will be winners and
losers. Force can be everything from mild coercion by implied force to armed conflict.
This would be a good time to discuss exactly what “winning hearts and minds” really
means. Misconceptions about “winning hearts and minds” Are pervasive. For Colonel
Thompson, he is not trying to be popular or to get people completely to accept the BCTs
program. At a minimum, he is trying to get the locals to reject the insurgency, the drug
lords, and the Taliban ideology through the actions of his unit and its support for local
initiatives. The locals, however, do not have to like the troops, but the locals must realize
that the troops can be an enabler for their goals. The more those goals coincide with the
goals of the local, regional, and national governments, the more support the troops will
receive. It is this disconnect between the goals of the security forces, the locals, and the
government that prevents winning hearts and minds. The Taliban, or any other
insurgency for that matter, must only prevent that synergy between the locals and their
government from happening. It is much easier to prevent those goals from coming
together than it is actually to bring them together. For instance, if the locals view the
government as ineffective or part of the criminal enterprise, the troops will never win the
local hearts and minds, no matter how admirably the troops can perform their mission.
Sounds like the current reality, which makes the situation dire indeed. Similarly, if the
troops operate in a heavy-handed manner, few development projects will succeed.
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Somewhere in the process, the students will attempt to clarify the situation, but don’t
allow them to clarify too much. Ambiguity is essential for this case study to work.
Anticipate relevant and irrelevant questions such as, “Where is the unit located?” “What
are the motivations of the (stakeholder)?” and more. Remember Colonel Thompson has
only been in the area for two weeks. He has several tasks to manage other than the drug
trade. His plate is overflowing, which is typical for a military leader in these situations, so
he must prioritize his tasks while optimizing his resources. Without a plan, he will
quickly respond to the urgent while forgetting the important.
Force the students to get into the arena with Colonel Thompson. Make them create the
key elements or lines of operation for his plan. The lesson should end with basic outlines
for two workable options that Colonel Thompson could use. The instructor should make
sure to ask the students what their “takeaways” are about policy execution and the
military mission.
QUESTIONS
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Now that you have read the information, what jumps out at you? What is your
“takeaway?”
o Anticipated responses might be: “It’s a circus where no one is in charge.”
“Typical international operation—no one can trust anyone.” “The takeaway is
that we should do things on our own.”
What stakeholders can Colonel Thompson “leverage?”
What stakeholders will have to change, be defeated, or be marginalized?
What does “hearts and minds” mean to you?
Can everyone be brought under one plan? Is that the goal? Is it even possible to
attempt such a task?
What is the acceptable outcome or the acceptable set of circumstances?
How long will it take to achieve such a goal? How does the goal determine the
resources required? (Resources: time, money, people, political will, and more.)
How do these agendas from each stakeholder influence Colonel Thompson’s
mission?
In broad strokes, if you were in Colonel Thompson’s boots, how would you
prioritize tasks? How can Colonel Thompson be most effective, when he might not
be able to influence all elements of stability in his AO?
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ENCLOSURE ONE: COURSE CARD INFORMATION ON
LESSONS FROM THE MARINE CORPS WAR COLLEGE
Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR)
Introduction: Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, Military Support for
Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) states that “Stability
operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be
prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat
operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including
doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel,
facilities, and planning.” This will have a tremendous impact on every aspect of planning,
programming, and budgeting as well as on operations. We have discussed many aspects
of SSTR at the War College, and doubtless we will discuss this topic in more detail
throughout the course.
Lecture, Guest Speaker, or Seminar Discussion (3-hour seminar, four hours
preparation): This lesson discusses aspects of the current operational environment related
to nation-building. Part Two examines the complexities of SSTR operations in a
multinational, multi-agency setting where traditional, command-directed control is
nonexistent. The oft-used phrase, “herding cats,” is an appropriate term. The layers of
complexity can be seen in the opium abatement and eradication efforts in Afghanistan.
Each year opium production in Afghanistan has increased despite greater reduction
efforts by the Afghan government and the international community. This “wicked
problem” continues to have a significant impact on the international community and on
U.S. national security. For the second lesson, a case study of present operations in
Afghanistan will be used to examine multinational and international operations and
Afghanistan’s burgeoning opium trade; we will explore the challenges of building a
failed state in a multinational environment.
Educational Objectives
•

Evaluate the Department of Defense’s role in SSTR and how this role conflicts
with the charters or mandates of nation states and civilian organizations from both
international government organizations and nongovernmental organizations.
Analyze possible points of friction.

•

Evaluate strategies for employing the instruments of national power in SSTR
operations.
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Required Reading and Other Preparation
The Atlantic Council. Saving Afghanistan: An Appeal and Plan for Urgent Action. Issue
Brief, January 2008, pp. 1–13.
Center for the Study of the Presidency. Afghanistan Study Group: Revitalizing our
Efforts, Rethinking our Strategies (Washington, DC: January 30, 2008), pp. 5–39.
Curry, Peter. Case Study No. 2: Dynamic Tension: Security, Stability and the Opium
Trade. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps War College, April 2009.
Department of Defense Directive 3000.05. Military Support for Stability, Security,
Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations (Washington, DC: September 16,
2009), pp. 1–11.
Department of State. US Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan (Washington, DC:
August 2007. Executive Summary only, pp. 1–12.
Glaze, John A. Opium and Afghanistan: Reassessing U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy
(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, October 2007), pp. 1–14.
Recommended Readings
Felbab-Brown, Vanda. Opium Licensing in Afghanistan: Its Desirability and Feasibility.
Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, Policy Paper Number 1, August 2007.
Dobbins, James, et al. The Beginner’s Guide to Nation Building (The RAND
Corporation, 2007).
International Crisis Group. “Reforming Afghanistan’s Police,” Asia Report 138 (August
30, 2007).
Discussion Topics
How has the move away from conventional war toward combating insurgency and
regional instability challenged the nation?
What challenges lie ahead as the U.S. military spends more resources on SSTR? As
the skill set increases for all leaders, how should the military change or transform to meet
these challenges?
Evaluate U.S. national-level policy and interagency coordination for SSTR operations.
What changes must be made as the military’s operating environment increases in size and
complexity?
JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION
JOINT LEARNING AREAS
1. Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in achieving strategic
objectives, with a focus on the employment of the military instrument of national
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power both as a supported instrument and as a supporting instrument of national
power.
2. Evaluate the national military strategy, especially with respect to the changing
nature of warfare.
3. Evaluate how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support
national objectives and relate to the national strategic, national military strategic,
theater strategic, and operational levels in war.
4. Apply an analytical framework that incorporates the role that factors such as
geopolitics, geostrategic, society, culture, and religion play in shaping the desired
outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns in the joint, interagency, and
multinational arena.
5. Analyze the capabilities and limitations of multinational forces in achieving the
appropriate strategic objectives in coalition operations.
6. Analyze the integration of joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities across
the range of military operations and plans—both in the preparation and the
execution phases—and evaluate its success in achieving the desired effects.
7. Analyze the principles, capabilities, and limitations of information operations
across the range of military operations and plans—to include pre- and postconflict
operations.
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ENCLOSURE TWO: INFORMATION ABOUT THE
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE
From the ISAF Web site, http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/index. html.
Note: The ISAF uses British English spelling, not American English.
NATO’S ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN
NATO’s main role in Afghanistan is to assist the Afghan government in exercising and
extending its authority and influence across the country, paving the way for
reconstruction and effective governance. It does this predominately through its UNmandated International Security Assistance Force.
Since NATO took command of the ISAF in 2003, the alliance has gradually expanded
the reach of its mission, originally limited to Kabul, to cover Afghanistan’s whole
territory. The number of ISAF troops has grown accordingly from the initial five
thousand to around fifty thousand troops coming from forty-one countries, including all
twenty-eight NATO members.
•

ISAF Missions

•

ISAF Mandate

•

The Evolution of the ISAF

ISAF MISSIONS
The ISAF is a key component of the international community’s engagement in
Afghanistan, assisting the Afghan authorities in providing security and stability and
creating the conditions for reconstruction and development.
Security
In accordance with all the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, the ISAF’s main
role is to assist the Afghan government in the establishment of a secure and stable
environment. To this end, ISAF forces are conducting security and stability operations
throughout the country together with the Afghan National Security Forces and are
directly involved in the development of the Afghan National Army through mentoring,
training, and equipping.
Conducting Security and Stability Operations
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The ISAF is conducting security and stability operations across Afghanistan, in
conjunction with the Afghan National Security Forces. A large and increasing proportion
of these operations are led by the Afghan forces.
Supporting the Afghan National Army
In addition, the ISAF is helping to bring the Afghan National Army up to operating
capability in support of the United States, which is sponsoring the overall Afghan Army
training and equipping program through its Combined Security Transition Command
Afghanistan.
In concrete terms, the ISAF is leading a number of Operational Mentoring and Liaison
Teams that are embedded in Afghan National Army Battalions (Kandaks), brigades, and
corps headquarters, to support training and deploy on operations in an advisory role.
These teams join Afghan units after the latter have received initial training at the Afghanled Kabul Military Training Centre.
The OMLTs also play a key liaison role between Afghan National Army units and
nearby ISAF forces, coordinating the planning of operations and ensuring that the Afghan
Army units receive enabling support. ISAF personnel deploy for periods of at least six
months in order to build enduring relationships with the Afghan Army and maximize the
mentoring effect.
In addition to training and mentoring the Afghan National Army, NATO-ISAF nations
provide donations to help equip the Afghan Army. Equipment donations include
individual equipment such as small arms, ammunition, and uniform items as well as
larger equipment to include tanks and helicopters.
Under the NATO Equipment Donation Program, Allied Command Operations, with
its headquarters in Mons, Belgium, coordinates equipment donations on behalf of ISAF
contributing nations. The determination of requirements and the validation process is
further coordinated with the United States.
An Afghan Army Trust Fund has also been established to cover the transportation and
installation costs of the equipment donations, the purchase of equipment, the purchase of
services for engineering and construction projects, and in/out-of-country training.
Supporting the Afghan National Police
Providing support to the Afghan National Police within means and capabilities is one of
the ISAF’s key tasks. In this sphere, the ISAF works in coordination with and in support
of the United States as well as the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan, which
was launched in June 2007.
The Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan officially assumes the lead
role in terms of police training on behalf of the U.S. government in the reformation of the
Afghan National Police.
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The ISAF assists the Afghan National Police, primarily at the tactical level, with
military support to operations, advice, shared information, and informal mentoring and
guidance. Local support involves both niche training of non-police-specific skills
provided by ISAF units, and indirect support, mentoring, and joint patrolling. Much of
this assistance is delivered through the medium of security committees and coordination
centers.
The Afghan Compact, a five-year plan between the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan and the international community, established a framework for
security sector reform and included the overall goals for and objectives of the Afghan
National Police. This agreement established the original goal to develop a sixty-two
thousand professional police service committed to the rule of law. This was later
modified by the Afghan National Development Strategy and subsequent decisions made
by the Government of Afghanistan, which set the new goal at eighty-two thousand police
officers.
Disarming Illegally Armed Groups
The ISAF is collecting illegal weapons, ordnance, and ammunition from armed groups
and individual persons. Weapons are then catalogued and safely destroyed so they no
longer represent a threat to the local population, Afghan National Security Forces, or
ISAF personnel.
Facilitating Ammunition Depots Management
NATO administrates a Trust Fund Project aimed at enhancing physical security at the
Afghan Army ammunitions depots and at supporting the development of the army’s
ammunition stockpile management capabilities. In 2008, the project was agreed to by the
Afghan government, ISAF contributing nations (including three lead nations, namely
Belgium, Canada, and Luxemburg), and the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency.
Providing Post operation Assistance
An ISAF Post-Operations Humanitarian Relief Fund was established in 2006 to provide
quick humanitarian assistance in the immediate aftermath of significant ISAF military
operations. This assistance includes the provision of food, shelter, and medicines as well
as the repair of buildings or key infrastructure. Such assistance is provided on a shortterm basis, and responsibility is handed over to civilian actors as soon as circumstances
permit.
The fund, established under the auspices of the commander of the ISAF, consists
entirely of voluntary donations from ISAF troop-contributing nations. The North Atlantic
Council is regularly updated on its use through NATO’s senior civilian representative in
Afghanistan.
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Reconstruction and Development
Through its Provincial Reconstruction Teams, the ISAF is supporting reconstruction and
development in Afghanistan, securing areas in which reconstruction work is conducted
by other national and international actors.
Where appropriate, and in close cooperation and coordination with the Government of
Afghanistan and UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission–Afghanistan)
representatives on the ground, the ISAF is also providing practical support for
reconstruction and development efforts, as well as support for humanitarian assistance
efforts conducted by Afghan government organizations, international organizations, and
NGOs.
Providing Security to Permit Reconstruction
Provincial reconstruction teams are at the leading edge of the alliance’s commitment to
reconstruction and development efforts in Afghanistan.
They consist of teams of civilian and military personnel working together to help
extend the authority of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
throughout the country by providing area security and supporting the reconstruction and
development activities of Afghan, international, national, and nongovernmental actors in
the provinces.
In addition to providing area security, provincial reconstruction teams also use their
diplomatic and economic capabilities to support security sector reform, encourage good
governance, and enable reconstruction and development.
While the provincial reconstruction teams’ civilian components take the lead on the
political, economic, humanitarian, and social aspects of the teams’ work in support of the
Afghan government’s national development priorities, military components focus on
increasing security and stability in the area and building security sector capacity. The
provincial reconstruction teams’ military components are also in charge of directing
assistance to the civilian elements, in particular at the levels of transport, medical
assistance, and engineering.
Overall, various kinds of projects are underway, facilitated by the NATO-ISAF
provincial reconstruction teams: Schools are being rebuilt with the mentoring or
assistance of ISAF engineers, allowing children to resume their education; irrigation
ditches, pipelines, reservoirs, and wells are being constructed to bring water to the local
population and farmers; infrastructure is being repaired and/or built to facilitate mobility
and communication; and local people are being provided with greater access to medical
assistance.
Currently, there are twenty-six provincial reconstruction teams operating throughout
the country. Some consist of military forces and civilian -personnel from a single nation;
others are multinational, with contributions from several different countries. They are all
led by individual ISAF nations. However, their military components come under the
ISAF command and are coordinated by the relevant regional command.
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Humanitarian Assistance
Upon request, ISAF provincial reconstruction teams are assisting the Afghan government
and international actors with humanitarian relief. In particular, ISAF soldiers have
launched several relief missions, distributing medication, food, and winter supplies to
help villagers cope with severe weather conditions in different parts of the country.
Governance
The ISAF, through its provincial reconstruction teams, is helping the Afghan authorities
strengthen the institutions required to fully establish good governance and rule of law and
to promote human rights. The teams’ principal mission in this respect consists of building
capacity, supporting the growth of governance structures, and promoting an environment
within which governance can improve.
Counternarcotics
In May 2003, the Afghan government adopted a National Drug Control Strategy aimed at
reducing the production of illicit drugs by 70 percent by 2007 and at eliminating all
production by 2012. A Counter-Narcotics Directorate is embedded in the Interior
Ministry, and a fully-fledged counternarcotics minister is presently one of the central
actors of the Afghan government.
Afghan capabilities in fighting narcotics and properly implementing its Drug Control
Strategy, however, remain largely dependent on international assistance. Against this
background, supporting the Afghan government’s counternarcotics programs is an ISAF
key supporting task.
Accordingly, when requested by the Afghan government, the ISAF supports
counternarcotics efforts by sharing information, conducting an efficient public
information campaign, and providing in extremis support to the Afghan National Security
Forces’ counternarcotics operations.
The ISAF also assists in training Afghan National Security Forces in counternarcotics
related activities and provides logistic support, when requested, for the delivery of
alternative livelihood programs.
As reflected in recent assessments by the United Nations and NATO’s own military
commanders, there is also a growing nexus between the narcotics industry and the
insurgency in some parts of the country. As a result, the Afghan government formally
requested that NATO-ISAF provide greater support in counternarcotics efforts, which the
allies agreed to do at the NATO Defense Ministers’ meeting in Budapest on October 10,
2008.
This enhanced support by the ISAF includes the destruction of processing facilities
and action against narcotic producers, if there is a clearly established link with the
insurgency. Such action by ISAF forces can be taken only upon request of the Afghan
government and with the consent of the national authorities of the forces involved.
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ISAF MANDATE
The ISAF has been deployed since 2001 under the authority of the UN Security Council,
which authorized the establishment of the force to assist the Afghan government “in the
maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim
Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure
environment.”
The ISAF is a coalition of the willing—not a UN force properly speaking—which has
a peace-enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
Nine UN Security Council resolutions relate to the ISAF, namely: 1386, 1413, 1444,
1510, 1563, 1623, 1707, 1776 and 1833 (on September 23, 2008). A detailed military
technical agreement between the ISAF commander and the Afghan Transitional
Authority in January 2002 provides additional guidance for ISAF operations.
NATO took command of the ISAF in August 2003 upon request of the United Nations
and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Soon after, the United
Nations gave the ISAF a mandate to expand outside of Kabul.

The Evolution of ISAF
Origin of the ISAF
The ISAF was created in accordance with the Bonn Conference in December 2001.
Afghan opposition leaders attending the conference began the process of reconstructing
their country by setting up a new government structure, namely the Afghan Transitional
Authority. The concept of an UN-mandated international force to assist the newly
established Afghan Transitional Authority was also launched at this occasion to create a
secure environment in and around Kabul and to support the reconstruction of
Afghanistan.
These agreements paved the way for the creation of a three-way partnership between
the Afghan Transitional Authority, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
and the ISAF.
NATO Takes on the ISAF Command
On August 11, 2003 NATO assumed leadership of the ISAF operation, ending the sixmonth national rotations. The alliance became responsible for the command,
coordination, and planning of the force, including the provision of a force commander
and a headquarters on the ground in Afghanistan.
This new leadership overcame the problem of a continual search to find new nations
to lead the mission and the difficulties of setting up a new headquarters every six months

Dynamic Tension: Security, Stability, and the Opium Trade

18

in a complex environment. A continuing NATO headquarters also enables small
countries, less likely to take over leadership responsibility, to play a strong role within a
multinational headquarters.
Expansion of the ISAF’s Presence in Afghanistan
The ISAF’s mandate was initially limited to providing security in and around Kabul. In
October 2003, the United Nations extended the ISAF’s mandate to cover the whole of
Afghanistan (UNSCR 1510), paving the way for an expansion of the mission across the
country.
Stage 1: To the North
In December 2003, the North Atlantic Council authorized the Supreme Allied
Commander, General James Jones, to initiate the expansion of the ISAF by taking over
command of the German-led provincial reconstruction team in Kunduz. The other eight
teams operating in Afghanistan in 2003 remained under the command of Operation
Enduring Freedom, the continuing U.S.-led military operation in Afghanistan.
On December 31, 2003, the military component of the Kunduz provincial
reconstruction team was placed under ISAF command as a pilot project and first step in
the expansion of the mission. Six months later, on June 28, 2004, at the summit meeting
of the NATO heads of state and government in Istanbul, NATO announced that it would
establish four other provincial reconstruction teams in the north of the country: in Mazare-Sharif, Meymana, Feyzabad, and Baghlan.
This process was completed on October 1, 2004, marking the completion of the first
phase of the ISAF’s expansion. The ISAF’s area of operations then covered some three
thousand six hundred square kilometers in the north, and the mission was able to
influence security in nine Northern provinces of the country.
Stage 2: To the West
On February 10, 2005, NATO announced that the ISAF would be further expanded,
into the west of Afghanistan.
This process began on May 31, 2006, when the ISAF took on command of two
additional provincial reconstruction teams, in the provinces of Herat and Farah and of a
forward support base (a logistic base) in Herat.
At the beginning of September, two further ISAF-led provincial reconstruction teams
in the west became operational, one in Chaghcharan, capital of Ghor Province, and one in
Qala-e-Naw, capital of Baghdis Province, completing the ISAF’s expansion into the west.
The extended ISAF mission led a total of nine provincial reconstruction teams, in the
north and the west, providing security assistance in 50 percent of Afghanistan’s territory.
The alliance continued to make preparations to further expand the ISAF, to the south of
the country.
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In September 2005, the alliance also temporarily deployed two thousand additional
troops to Afghanistan to support the September 18 provincial and parliamentary
elections.
Stage 3: To the South
On December 8, 2005, in a meeting at NATO headquarters in Brussels, the Allied
Foreign Ministers endorsed a plan that paved the way for an expanded the ISAF role and
presence in Afghanistan. The first element of this plan was the expansion of the ISAF to
the south in 2006, also known as Stage 3.
This was implemented on July 31, 2006, when the ISAF assumed command of the
southern region of Afghanistan from U.S.-led coalition forces, expanding its area of
operations to cover an additional six provinces—Day Kundi, Helmand, Kandahar,
Nimroz, Uruzgan, and Zabul—and taking on command of four additional provincial
reconstruction teams.
The expanded ISAF led a total of thirteen teams in the north, west, and south,
covering some three-quarters of Afghanistan’s territory.
The number of ISAF forces in the country also increased significantly, from about ten
thousand prior to the expansion to about twenty thousand after.
Stage 4: The ISAF Expands to the East, Takes Responsibility for Entire Country
On October 5, 2006, the ISAF implemented the final stage of its expansion by taking
on command of the international military forces in eastern Afghanistan from the U.S.-led
coalition.
In addition to expanding the alliance’s area of operations, the revised operational plan
also paved the way for a greater ISAF role in the country. This included the deployment
of ISAF operational mentoring and liaison teams to Afghan National Army units at
various levels of command.
Additional Materials
Map of ethnic tribes: Most commonly used maps divide the ethnic tribes into ten or
eleven basic groups. The Afghan landscape is more complex, so if the instructor uses
one of these maps (such as the National Geographic), explain to the students these
complexities.
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ENCLOSURE THREE-- HANDOUT:
Key Stakeholders and their Positions
Student task: Be prepared to make your agenda known to Colonel Thompson using this
handout and out-of-class preparation. The quality of your preparation and discussion with
Colonel Thompson will be graded.
1. NATO Member States
•

Severely limited by operational caveats. Each of the twenty-eight nations has
caveats or restrictions on the employment of forces. Some limits include the
conditions under which forces will be employed, the circumstances permitting units
to support another country’s military forces, the countries that will command their
forces, or the locations where those forces can be employed.

•

The countries operating in Regional Command South (RC-South) have all agreed to
limit their caveats and understand that their situation could include combat. The
Dutch, U.K., and Canadian forces have admirably fought the Taliban and the drug
problem; they are still restricted by their countries’ mandates and inadequate
combat support elements. This has limited their effectiveness and has put 4BCT “on
call” for support if problems arise along the RC-South and RC-East boundary.

•

These forces are less aggressive than the U.S. forces partly due to an adherence to
what the United Kingdom would term “The Comprehensive Approach,” or “the
softly-softly” approach, emphasizing the need for the proper mix of security,
economic, social, and political tools. This approach has had mixed results; it has
been successful in areas where insurgent activity is low, but it has been less
successful in areas where there is an entrenched insurgency.

This approach does not differ significantly from the US approach; however, the U.S.
approach favors security and some low-level economic impact projects as a precondition
for other advances.
2. NATO as a Multilateral Institution
•

NATO forces are loath to be seen as the implementer of any counternarcotics
efforts, certainly ones that disrupt stability such as interdiction and eradication with
no alternative livelihood programs. NATO sees itself as a stabilizing, somewhat
impartial force, although the locals may not see the situation the same way.

•

Despite leaders’ summits issuing proclamations that NATO is of one voice, this is
far from the truth. NATO is a coalition, where much wrangling goes on behind the
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scenes and, indeed, in the open press. In order to create some semblance of
consensus from a twenty-eight-member group, there is a tendency to adopt “low
hanging fruit” strategies, which reduces the alliance’s leverage.
•

The Bonn Agreement allowed NATO to act in support of the UN resolution. It
was intended to give the United Nations more “teeth,” which it has done, but it has
fallen short of expectations both internally in Afghanistan and on the world stage.
One result of the agreement created a zero-sum game on the ground. While the
alliances that supported the United States early on were clear “winners,” it
disenfranchised the largest ethnic group, the Pashtuns, but did not take away their
ability to resist due to NATO’s lack of troop commitment.1 As a consequence of
NATO’s conducting operations on the cheap, large swaths of Afghan territory are
under the control of local leaders—not the Government of Afghanistan.
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3. U.S. Government
•

The State Department is the lead U.S. agency for the counternarcotics program.
Although the United Kingdom has the lead for the international effort, the United
States has key enabling assets and is the indispensible partner. The U.S.’s
counternarcotics strategy contains five pillars: Eradication (the most resourced
pillar since 2001), Alternative Livelihoods, Interdiction/Law Enforcement, Justice
Reform, and Public Information.2

•

The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) has significantly increased its efforts to train
Afghan counternarcotics forces. While there has been measureable improvement in
the quality of some Afghan forces, the DEA remains a small element with a large
mandate ahead. Its primary focus is improving the interdiction efforts of Afghan
MOI (Ministry of Interior) units.3

For more information, see the U.S. Department of State’s U.S. Counternarcotics
Strategy for Afghanistan (Washington, DC: August 2007), http://www.
state.gov/documents/organization/90671.pdf.
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4. U.S. Military
•

While recognizing the risk of destabilization of the area in the short term, the
military advocates a “strong and robust” antidrug policy on the ground.

•

The military would prefer not to lead or show major support of the effort; however,
due to the lack of civilian resources, it feels obligated to “do whatever it takes” to
get the problem under control.

•

The military understands the need for a comprehensive approach, but with limited
U.S. government resources, it would prefer actions such as interdiction and
eradication as the immediate first steps aimed at disrupting the drug network.

•

The military considers the drug trade as the “rear area logistics,” or the lifeblood, to
the insurgency. Eliminate the drugs, and the enemy withers on the vine.
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5. Afghan Government
• The Ministry of Interior, which is responsible for drug trade law enforcement, has
been riddled with corruption and graft, according to several reports.4 The ministry
has been implicated as being an enabling actor to favored drug lords.
•

The current Afghan government’s power base remains primarily around Kabul’s
environs, with little influence in distant provinces except where there is a
significant NATO or U.S. presence.5

• There is a network of patronage and protection for favored drug lords throughout
the government, from the local to the national level, making enforcement difficult.
• The Afghan National Army is the main institution that is respected by most of the
population. This has been primarily because the army has engaged in
counterinsurgency operations near the border but not in efforts to eliminate opium
production.
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6. Local Population
•

The Taliban, albeit corrupt in its own right, was seen as a stabilizing force
following the post-Soviet era of lawlessness, criminality, and corruption. Its
eventual opium production ban was seen by the local population as good; however,
the ban’s unintended consequence was that it made the opium trade more risky and
therefore more lucrative. Opium prices shot up tenfold, and farmers were forced to
grow poppy to pay off debts to warlords.6

•

People do not believe that any national institution has legitimacy to govern, a
political idea that the Taliban tries to leverage, with limited success, and that the
drug lords exploit.

•

The farmers also have strong views: “Many Afghan farming households cultivate
opium poppy in order to improve their access to land, water, agricultural supplies,
and credit—inputs that remain in short supply in many of the rural areas where
opium poppy is grown. Experts have identified high levels of household debt as a
powerful structural determinant of the continuation of opium poppy cultivation
among some Afghan farmers.”7
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7. Local Government
Throughout much of the southern region, local governments have been sacked and
installed frequently. Assassination and intimidation make it difficult to install effective
governors and provincial leaders. Those that do survive are primarily doing so by
acquiescing to local power broker demands while depending on a corrupt, untrained
police force for personal protection.
8. The Taliban
The Taliban physical presence is relatively small, and support for the Taliban in general
is limited. However, Taliban influence extends fairly deep into the government. Some
influence is through clan relations; some influence is gained by familiarity with its
members. Increasingly, the Taliban has resorted to bribery, graft, and extortion to make
local government more compliant to Taliban aims.
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United Kingdom

• Prefers a multidimensional, comprehensive approach that reduces the dependency on
the drug trade in the local and national economies.
• Opposes certain tactics, such as eradication through aerial spraying of crop-killing
chemicals, because, the argument goes, these tactics are ineffective at best and
counterproductive at worst. Considers aerial spraying only one tool at its disposal, but
a tool used only under extraordinary circumstances.
10. United Nations (UN)
The United Nations, through its various organs, has issued several comprehensive reports
on reducing opium production. The action on the ground, however, has been limited at
best. From the beginning of the UN mission in 2002, the purpose of the United Nations
has been to guide the Afghan people, and hence their government, to solve the issue with
international support. By dealing with local power brokers, the counterdrug mission has
been working at cross-purposes. Many local power brokers, who are needed for their
knowledge and support of the security mission (counterterrorism/ /counterinsurgency) are
also profiting, either directly or indirectly, from the drug trade.
See the UN Office of Drugs and Crime’s Web site on drugs in Afghanistan for more:
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/afghanistan.html.
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11. Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs)
• Although not monolithic, many NGOs see the United States as a contributor to the
problem. The United States paid millions of dollars to anti-Taliban commanders
during the initial phase of the war in 2001. While the campaign successfully drove
the Taliban from power, the money flooded the meager Afghan economy, which
incentivized power brokers to expand opium operations while floating loans to
farmers to increase opium production in 2002. The NGOs believe that the
Americans ignored the increasing drug profiteering and corruption in order to get
good intelligence to fight Al Qaeda and its Taliban supporters.
• NGOs have commented that their ability to implement programs safely and
effectively is increasingly jeopardized by the deteriorating security situation. In
some districts, NGOs have significantly reduced their operations or even
withdrawn entirely as their staff, projects, and beneficiaries have come under
attack.

1

•

NGOs insist that reconstruction should be aimed at long-term development, where
partners can be vetted and projects can be more effective. The military is focused
on short-term impact projects, which potentially work at cross-purposes with
development programs.8

•

NGOs believe that the military is insufficiently sensitive to cultural and social
norms which define individual security and dignity.9
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